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INTRODUCTION
Some works of art are, it seems fair to say, especially suited to puzzling people.
I myself have reacted various ways to this kind of puzzlement. It certainly
has simply frustrated me, or alienated me from a work. But then there are
cases where there’s something about a work that induces me to figure out why
I’m puzzled, and this often involves addressing questions about meaning. It’s
relatively easy to find examples of art that can play a role like this for people,
especially if we focus on work from the early-20th century on. Consider a
recent discussion of Picasso’s Guernica (1937), on the occasion of an 80th-
anniversary exhibition of it at the National Picasso Museum in Paris. It
seems part of the work’s significance and of its value, that we are, collectively,
still discussing ‘the work’s contradictions’, and sorting through the possible
meanings of the bull and the horse.1
In this paper I want to say a few things about another work that has
puzzled (admittedly fewer) people – Corneliu Porumboiu’s Police, Adjective
(Romania, 2009) – and I want to make some suggestions about why spending
time with it might be worthwhile (which then would speak to part of the
meaning and/or significance of the film). For it could of course be the case
that my being puzzled by this film and your being puzzled by this film, for
instance, could just be a consequence of its being a mediocre or even bad
work of art, and thus there might then be nothing terribly interesting to say.
An English-language trailer for the film describes itself succinctly via a
definition: ‘Police, adjective: a novel or film involving criminal happenings
resolved through the ingenuity of a police officer.’2 I’ll elaborate on this
slightly. The ‘criminal happenings’ here involve teenagers using drugs. A
good portion of the film involves lengthy scenes (and lengthy takes) of a
police officer named Cristi on stakeouts, which are efforts to obtain evidence
about the drug use. The best candidate for a police officer’s ‘ingenuity’ is
surely what a number of critics have in fact identified as the climax of the
film: extended readings of definitions from a dictionary during a meeting
between Cristi and his boss.
I want to try to make sense of these features I’ve highlighted: i) the
fact that much of the film involves the viewer’s watching what people are
inclined to call ‘nothing,’ (or alternately, ‘everything’ as one reviewer put
it3) and ii) how the climax of the film is reading from a dictionary. We can
see many examples of people being puzzled by the film, expressed in the
form of film criticism. Criticism is useful as concrete records of people saying
what the film is, saying ‘what the film means’, and evaluating it positively
or negatively. The features I’ve highlighted are surely at least part of why
professional and amateur critics alike have written that they ‘fell asleep twice
during viewing’,4 and that it’s ‘the worst foreign film I’ve ever seen in my life
. . . Nothing happens. Nothing.’5 I want to give a plausible account of why this
film might have these features, that is, how they might figure in the meaning
of the film (or better, how they might figure in an aspect of the meaningfulness
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of the film): because at the same time, critics have also said rather glowing
things, such as that the film is ‘utterly plain . . . and marvelously rich’.6 Film
Quarterly named it its 2009 Best Film of the Year, and it won the ‘Jury
Prize – Un Certain Regard’ at Cannes in that year. Thus I would also like
to come to some understanding of how this film could provoke these different
responses.
My aim here is ‘critical’, in something like Arthur Danto’s sense.7 By
saying this, I mean that I want to say something about what this film might
be, why it might have the features that it does, and, thus, how it could indeed
be seen as ‘marvelously rich’ or ‘so extraordinary’.8 This will amount to giving
plausible reasons. I do not mean to exclude other possible characterisations of
the film, why it is as it is, or indeed assessments of its significance. (I am not
actually sure how any characterisation could do that, since the film ‘belongs
to the world’.9) I want to note that it seems appropriate to describe the
‘giving of plausible reasons’ (critical practice) as a social activity. I say this
because the standard for ‘plausibility’ here is something like ‘it makes (some)
sense of the feature(s) under discussion’, and we typically say someone has
‘made-sense-of’ something when others are led to understand things better.
(Or at least, we can see how this would happen.)
‘Understanding things better’ is a goal then for good criticism. A typical
way I come to think another’s words have made sense of something, is that I
(and others) take up those words. And a good justification for my doing so
is that what they’ve said points to specific features of the work, so that I am
readily able to assess whether the words seem apt.
Now in addition to discussing the film, I will also present some things that
Ludwig Wittgenstein says related to ‘aesthetic explanations’ in his ‘Lectures
on Aesthetics’ from 1938.10 My reason for this is to juxtapose another work
that I find I want to say similar things about, as I find they provoke me,
or work on me, similarly as a viewer/reader. My hope is that each might
illuminate the other, for purposes of making sense of the two works’ features
– and consequently also for saying something about why spending time with
them might be worthwhile. I will return to this idea below, but for now I’ll
just suggest that the Wittgenstein text and Police, Adjective are on a par
with each other as puzzling works-to-be-made-sense-of.
I. THE RULES OF THE GAME
I want to begin by discussing a scene from the very beginning of the film, as it
turns out to be one of the few scenes not treating the investigation directly.11
As it comes so early, it is more puzzling in retrospect, especially given the
scenes position in the structure of the film. The scene involves a conversation
between the main police officer, Cristi, and a coworker who shows up at his
office. The coworker is looking for Cristi’s officemate, who is not there. Since
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Cristi is there, however, his coworker seizes the opportunity to ask about the
foot-tennis club he plays in. He’s looking to lose some weight, and he gets
bored when running. Cristi is clearly not interested. The matches he plays in
are more serious than this. The coworker is persistent though. Cristi asserts
that he won’t be up to their level of play; the coworker wants to know how
Cristi knows he won’t play well. Cristi then suggests that ‘if you’re weak at
football, you’re weak at foot-tennis.’ How does he know this? Is it written
down somewhere, he’s asked? ‘No, but it’s still a law.’ The coworker is
offended: ‘Serious game, this foot-tennis.’
Obviously a film about a police investigation is going to involve the law
in various ways. This ‘law of foot-tennis’ is surely not what we would expect
however. So what is the point? What we are given, at the beginning of
the film (and so perhaps as a kind of preparation for what follows), are two
possible conceptions of a law: one is that a law could be something that is
explicitly stated/written, another is that it’s something we come to know
because of experience with the subject matter. Presumably Cristi knows this
law because he’s played or seen foot-tennis played by people who were not
good at football to begin with. So he’s induced this generalisation. And given
that this group of players has certain expectations about their matches, the
coworker is not a good fit.
In his ‘Lectures on Aesthetics’, Wittgenstein discusses rules at a number
of points. There is a scene early on (LA I, 15) where Wittgenstein imagines
a kind of tailor’s apprenticeship. He proposes in this scene that there are two
cases of ‘correctness’ with respect to rules of tailoring – two ways of acting in
accord with rules. (He’s thinking here about how one makes one’s way into
some kind of aesthetic practice; it could be painting, drawing, etc., though
again his immediate example is, interestingly, tailoring.) One learns all the
rules first by being told them by the person teaching him. In this way, doing
the correct thing is simply doing what one has been told, doing what the
rules say to do. ‘This is how long a coat is to be, how wide the sleeve must
be, etc.’ (LA I, 15).
But then there is a second way of acting in a ‘correct way’: ‘I develop
a feeling for the rules,’ Wittgenstein says. Then I can do something that
is not in explicit agreement with the rules as taught, but in fact does agree
with my understanding of what we might call the point of the rules. This
is typically something we can learn by experience; Wittgenstein suggests our
understanding of the rules can get more refined as time goes on.
This section of the ‘Lectures on Aesthetics’ parallels the film for a few
reasons, but for now I want to highlight that Wittgenstein is describing a
way in which we can come to understand how to do something well that
needn’t be part of the explicitly stated rules or instructions for that activity.
Wittgenstein calls this a kind of ‘aesthetic judgment’. It comes about, if
it does, from a certain sensitivity that is honed over time. And it might
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even happen that understanding in this sense would lead us to approve of
something as ‘correct’ that wouldn’t have counted as such were we to adhere
strictly to the rules we were taught.
Now if we compare Wittgenstein’s talking about this tailor to Cristi’s
talking about his foot-tennis matches, we can see some similar circumstances.
Perhaps Cristi is suggesting he and his friends have a more refined sense of
their playing the sport, given their experience doing so. Hence the reluctance
to accept someone with a different understanding of the point of playing.
Further, in stating his football/foot-tennis law, Cristi is actually giving voice
to part of his understanding of the game, which he has acquired in virtue of
his experience and in virtue of his conception of the point of playing. Hence
why ‘it’s a law, though it’s not written anywhere.’
Something we might say, in virtue of seeing both the tailoring scenario
and Cristi’s discussion alongside each other, is that one can adopt different
attitudes toward our experiences with things. One may be happy with playing
foot-tennis to lose weight; similarly one may be happy with making a coat
strictly according to the steps as described by one’s teacher.
Note too that in Wittgenstein’s discussion and in the foot-tennis discus-
sion, there is, as one might put it, a normative component. Or at least, there
are ‘(value) judgments’ (in an ordinary sense) that figure in both. Value
seems to be an aspect of the attitude brought to the experience. So Cristi is
dismissive of his co-worker’s desire to play, and one could imagine the tailor
who makes ‘aesthetic judgments’ looking down on one who does not.
This scene also explicitly suggests some of the broad scope or ambition
both of the text and of the film. For just as Wittgenstein discusses a tailor
in the context of the arts, Porumboiu gives us a discussion of foot-tennis in
the context of a criminal investigation. It seems plausible to conclude from
each of these pairings that the overall works have – or at least, are intended
to have – a wider relevance than it might first seem.
II. POP POETRY
I want to turn next to another scene in the film, that in which Cristi comes
home from work and his wife/partner is listening to a song online.12 She
listens to it over and over again, while we see Cristi prepare and then eat the
food she had cooked earlier. The song plays all the way through two times, at
a very imposing volume. The effect of this for me was at first mild irritation
and alienation, but then I found myself focusing on the song more. Part-way
through the third playing, Cristi says finally to his wife, ‘ “Anca, this song
doesn’t make any sense.” ’ The song is, we might say, a melodramatic love
song. Cristi quotes the song: ‘ “What would the field be without the flower?”
“What would the sea be without the sun?” “What else would it be?” ’ he
says, ‘ “It would still be the field and the sea.” ’ Her response is: ‘ “I haven’t
paid that much attention to the lyrics . . . ” ’ She says she likes it because the
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lyrics are like images or symbols. Cristi seems not to understand this at all.
I suggest that we might think of this scene as enacting an instance of
criticism. Cristi is puzzled by the song, which he doesn’t understand. Anca
is enjoying it and would seemingly listen to it indefinitely. He challenges the
song’s meaningfulness, and what ensues is a discussion of the song and what
it might mean.
Cristi seems to think that the song is ‘meaningless’ because the words,
taken literally, are at best banal. This would conflict with the melodramatic,
grandiose musical context in which they are given to us. And they seem then
to be asserting nothing. (E.g., ‘The field without the flower would be a field,
just without the flower.’) Anca is not focusing on the words ‘taken literally’
in this way, though. She hasn’t thought about the lyrics in this way. She likes
the imagery, or the potential symbolism of the pairs (the field and flower, the
sea and sun) – and therein lies the romantic appeal for her presumably. Their
attitudes lead them to disagreement about the song.
Anca is giving voice to her appreciation for the poetic aspects of the song;
this is a demonstration of, or an expression of, her taste. In (LA I, 12)
Wittgenstein abruptly asks, ‘Take the question: How should poetry be read?
What is the correct way of reading it?’ He suggests that for some poetry
stressing the lines differently helps – you understand it differently. That is,
the words themselves don’t change, but stressing them differently can help
to get you to make sense of them. So ‘[a] man says it ought to be read
this way and reads it to you. You say: “Oh yes. Now it makes sense”.’ This
underscores the possibility of understanding the same words in different ways.
Note that Wittgenstein’s example here is from poetry, too. It seems fair to
call the song’s language use ‘poetic’ (i.e. in an ordinary sense, ‘non-literal’).
In (LA I, 25-26) Wittgenstein suggests that expressions of aesthetic judg-
ment, or of taste, ‘play a very complicated role . . . in what we call the culture
of a period . . .What belongs to a language-game is a whole culture. In de-
scribing musical taste you have to describe whether children give concerts,
whether women do or whether men only give them, etc. etc.’
If we put these two parts of the ‘Lectures on Aesthetics’ together alongside
the film, we might arrive at something like this: Anca’s words about the
lyrics are expressions of aesthetic judgment and understanding, and though
this departs from what we might be tempted to call the literal meaning of the
words, it is hard to know what might be relevant from the rest of the culture
for understanding the song better. That it is a romantic, melodramatic pop(-
ish) song from the late-20th/early-21st century is probably important for
understanding it, along with the ‘tradition’13 or customary practices of this
type of music.14
So Cristi and Anca are at an impasse. We see no neat resolution for
making sense of the song. What might be the purpose of this scene in the
film? My proposal, too quickly, is that it is priming us for thinking about the
film itself. Perhaps the idea is this: that the film, as an object of criticism,
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is analogous to the song. Cristi and Anca are representatives then, of two
(I would say ‘natural’) ways of making sense of the film – and thus also of
two attitudes we might bring to the film, to its plot and script, its scenes.
In a literal way, we see ‘scenes of nothing’ or banalities throughout the film.
But if we have paid attention to this scene we are explicitly made aware that
understanding what is given to us in these scenes could be something else.
So I will turn to these next. In trying to make sense of them I will be in
effect trying to say ‘what’s in them’ and that ‘our time spent with them was
worthwhile’, to paraphrase Stanley Cavell.15
Another comment about the relationship between the film and theWittgen-
stein text: In giving us the poetry example, Wittgenstein could also be said
to be doing the same thing as I’m proposing for the film. Wittgenstein is
priming us for thinking about, for making sense of, what he is saying in his
Lectures. Both works then could be seen as preparing the viewer/the reader
for engaging in making-sense-of, that is, in criticism. They indicate an atti-
tude and then create work for their (receptive) audience.16 One reason for
some of the negative critical responses to the film could then be that the
reviewer might have a lack of receptivity or openness to certain possibilities.
Another reason could be that they just do not find these possibilities valuable.
And of course yet another could be that what I am saying here is unjustified.
Now if my comparing these two texts is plausible, and if what I’m say-
ing about the film is plausible, then this suggests what Wittgenstein says is
plausible too. That is, I’m assuming the standards for either of these works
making sense is similar. It is tempting to think of the relationship between
a film and a philosophical text as the former being an instance of the ideas
in the latter. Certainly that could be the case, but what I find potentially
objectionable in this is what amounts to an assumption that the philosoph-
ical text somehow justifies what we say about the film, that its plausibility
is somehow independently assured. I’ll return to this point at the end of this
paper.
III. WATCHING AND NOTHINGNESS
There are at least two scenes in Police, Adjective which could be the ones
alluded to in the Rotten Tomatoes user comment that spoke of ‘nothing’
happening. There are two scenes, of eight and of ten minutes each, in which
Cristi silently stands, paces, smokes, and leans against cinder blocks.17 (See
Figure 1.) In terms of the investigation he is conducting, he is watching the
boy’s house to see if anything suspicious happens. In terms of our typical
expectations of a movie, these scenes are challenging for their duration, first,
and also given that after a minute or so, we do not ‘get any new information’
with respect to the plot. Indeed, one could imagine these scenes lasting just
a minute or two, and their effect in terms of the storyline of the investigation
would be essentially the same. So why include these scenes as 16 % of the
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film’s length? (There are other such scenes as well, for instance Cristi eating
lunch.)
Figure 1: Cristi on stakeout.
My assumption is to try to find reasons that suggest why their inclusion
might make sense. When I watch eight or ten minute scenes such as these,
I glance at and take note of the clock or of the counter on the DVD player,
etc. I tend to become aware of the length of the scenes, and then I become
aware of watching a lengthy scene. Many other scenes in the film are one or
two minutes. These are less likely to make me aware of their length. But in
this film, in the context of their being together with those other short scenes,
I experience watching a ten-minute scene differently. It seems plausible then
that this is one explanation why reviews mention them.
The awareness these scenes can generate coincides then with the awareness
of the possibilities for critical interpretation I suggested above regarding the
pop song discussion. By becoming aware of watching a lengthy scene in which
my filmic expectations are frustrated, I am then more likely to ask, as indeed
I did, why those scenes are there. Is there a good reason? That is, I am
prompted to engage in a critical exercise that I have also being primed to
undertake. The discussion of the song was more ‘rational’, we might say,
while the ‘scenes of nothing’ are more affective in their prompting, at least
initially.18
But then when I re-focus my attention on what we do see in these scenes,
to try to make sense of them, it’s of course not the case that we see nothing.
For I do see a man standing, leaning, smoking, taking a phone from his
pocket, drinking tea, etc. And it is striking perhaps that there is no acting,
no performance required for the actor to show us these things. The actor
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simply does them. This is also perhaps what bothers some viewers. The
person we see is smoking; he is leaning against cinder blocks, etc. These
actions then function in a way like a Duchamp ready-made. For one thing,
at least, that a ready-made does is to present a supposed ordinary non-art
thing as art in an art context, thereby commonly prompting the viewer to
question it. Duchamp’s Fountain still accomplishes this, over 100 years since
its being inserted into the art world.19
My suggestion is that we can make sense of the work the film is doing if
we conceive of it as trying to move the audience toward a goal: it works on
the rational and affective fronts to get us to become aware of the very film
itself – our watching and experiencing it, and our making sense of it – and to
foster a more careful critical attitude to it in order to make better sense of it.
All along, it works to undermine a tempting yet simplistic response, namely,
that ‘nothing happens’, full-stop, or at least to prevent us from succumbing
to this temptation unthinkingly.
IV. DINNER AND A DICTIONARY
Prior to the heralded dictionary-reading climax of the movie, there is a brief
scene wherein Cristi and Anca are eating a meal.20 ‘Something between us
isn’t working,’ Anca says somewhat abruptly. They have apparently not
been eating together as much as they used to. She then mentions having
read Cristi’s investigation file, which he had left in the apartment. ‘You
made a mistake,’ she says. She then goes on to tell him that the Romanian
Academy had changed the spelling of a two-word phrase he used, regarding
it now as one word (‘a negative pronominal adjective’).21 A scene that be-
gins with two people discussing a potential problem with their relationship
immediately turns to discussing language, and grammatical rules. Cristi is
amazed there are people who think about and make decisions about these
things. The conversation then returns to discord when Anca tries to discuss
the investigation and whether he will make an arrest. ‘You know I don’t like
to talk about work,’ he says.22
This scene is sort of a prologue to the extended final scene. The final scene
centers on discussing words and their meanings. Why lead into a discussion
of language with this particular very brief discussion of language? The pair-
ing in the dinner scene suggests that language relates to how we get along.
Recalling Wittgenstein’s comment that ‘what belongs to a language-game is
a whole culture’, we can perhaps suggest that ‘language working smoothly’
is tied to our being aware of, and our understanding, relevant parts of the
culture. Wittgenstein’s examples after saying this are examples of what peo-
ple actually do. That is, what’s relevant goes beyond, we might say, ‘mere
words’ – what’s relevant is how people live, things they do, how they relate
to each other. (So it makes sense that Anca would say that something isn’t
working between them, and then that we see a discussion of the Romanian
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language.23)
The next day Cristi is called to meet with his boss, the Captain, as he’s
not happy with the lack of progress in the investigation. Cristi and his office-
mate (who’s forced to come along) wait for five minutes in the secretary’s
office while the Captain reviews Cristi’s case dossier. Then they are called
in, for what will be the longest scene of the movie.24
The Captain, as Cristi well knew days before, wants him to arrest the
surveilled teenager for drug possession and perhaps for dealing. Cristi is
opposed to this, as he believes laws on drug use will change soon and he
doesn’t want an inevitable prison sentence to weigh on his conscience. He
also doesn’t believe the kid is actually a dealer. The Captain then says, in
Socratic fashion, ‘I think we’re talking different languages. Tell me what
‘conscience’ means for you. Define ‘conscience’.’25 Cristi, echoing Augustine,
stammers a bit, but settles on ‘something within me that stops me from doing
something that afterwards I’d regret.’ The Captain then orders his secretary
to find and to bring a dictionary to his office within five minutes, presumably
to settle things.
Figure 2: Cristi reading from the dictionary in the Captain’s office.
Just before it arrives, the Captain says, ‘do you know what we’re doing
here? . . . Dialectics . . . finding out the truth.’ The dictionary arrives and Cristi
reads the definition of ‘conscience’ aloud. (See Figure 2.) It is a ‘feeling or
intuition’ that leads one ‘to be sure of not having transgressed moral law or the
laws of the state.’26 It would seem that Cristi is worried about transgressing
what the Captain calls ‘his own moral law’. So he is told to look up ‘moral
law’, but there is no definition given for it under ‘law’. Under ‘moral’, again,
there is no definition of ‘moral law’. So the Captain concludes, ‘moral law
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is something vague that depends on each person . . . This leads us to chaos,
right?’ Thus we need to return to consider the laws of the state, and as a
police officer, the Captain asserts, Cristi must choose to uphold the laws of
the State.
Both the dinner scene and the dictionary scene involve instances of arbi-
trating language. In both cases, people involved are concretely affected by the
act of arbitration. (It’s not ‘merely a matter of semantics’ in other words.)
And further, second scene gives us a potential reason why arbitration is nec-
essary: otherwise chaos would ensue. However I am sympathetic to Cristi’s
position in this scene (I feel bad for the kid), and so I want to say that the
chaos-view is surely an exaggeration. That we say things in a world along
with others who also say things is enough. And further there is a danger in
the chief’s view: people are forced to do things they do not want/do not agree
with. The adjudication rejects the other attitude. It is a ‘closed attitude’.
The film presents both types of attitude and leaves it up to us however,
as must be the case. Just as with the song. Can the film be said to offer an
openness? Or is it instead prompting awareness of the choice? Could it be
used in either of these ways?
V. WHEN ATTITUDES BECOME FORM
I could describe an aspect of Cristi’s character here as the following. As he
had concerning foot-tennis, but not as he approached the pop song, he has
an understanding of what the point of the law is. In his judgment, applying
the ‘letter of the law’ in this case would not be in accord with the point of the
law (or the ‘spirit of the law’, as we also say). He also gives reasons for his
judgment. The Captain is uninterested in these reasons; he is uninterested in
Cristi’s judgment about the point of the law. His position is one of his staying
true to the letter of the law as he sees it, and he not-unreasonably believes
that this is what the police must do. According to the law ‘as written’, the
boy committed a crime and can/should be punished for it.
It is of note that Cristi does not exhibit this attitude in the discussion of
the song with his wife. We might then worry that this makes Cristi somehow
an inconsistent character. But if we assume this scene is playing a meaningful
part of the whole film, I would suggest that instead, we can see this as more
‘realistic’ – and by this term I just mean that it makes sense, in that people
might very well act this way. When it comes to applying a rule, whether
it’s in the case of a law, playing a game, using a word, we have both of
these tendencies. So I find both understandable. Poetry and the law may be
something like (surely idealised) limiting cases then, in a mathematical sense,
on the continuum between adhering to the point of the rule and to the ‘letter
of the rule’.
This could help us understand why Wittgenstein says that there are two
senses of ‘correct’ in the example I began with from the ‘Lectures on Aes-
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thetics’. He doesn’t seem to give either priority.27 What is interesting is that
it’s ‘acting in virtue of having internalised a rule and seeing its point’ that
Wittgenstein wants to say reflects something aesthetic. The features of what
one has done or made are not then accidental; instead they reflect one having
seen a relevant point. (Or the features can be seen in this way, even if one had
not actually reflected on a relevant point of the activity. For often, surely, an
artist for example simply acts.)
And this is why they were not actually engaged in ‘dialectics’, in any useful
sense. The Captain uses the dictionary to solve a philosophical problem.
‘Moral law’ is vague and depends on each person, since it cannot be found in
the dictionary. The dictionary has been used to reveal to us the nature of the
moral law. This is obviously too quick, as far as philosophical arguments go.
Why this is not a good argument might relate to common criticisms of so-
called ordinary language philosophy, which is sometimes portrayed as engaged
in something like this kind of activity.28 Indeed, Wittgenstein sometimes is
portrayed in this way. But Wittgenstein is in fact interested in reason-giving,
as we see in the ‘Lectures on Aesthetics’ (as well in the PI): what are the
various reasons, for example, I want to use this word rather than that to
describe a situation?29 Now if ‘dialectics’ here is something like the use of
conversation – and thus partly of giving reasons to others – to arrive at what’s
true (in an ordinary sense!), then this is not what happens in the meeting
with the Captain. The Captain excludes some reasons from the discussion,
and he uses the authority of the dictionary, as well as the power of his social
position vis-à-vis Cristi, to do so.
So the meeting involved the exercise of power, using the rhetoric/appearance
of ‘dialectics’. This is to acknowledge obvious political and moral dimensions
of the film however, which are beyond my scope here but which would surely
figure into the meaning of this work. What I have been focused on however is
the way in which Police, Adjective works to get us to think about aspects of
criticism, as well as aspects of the language we use for criticism. Secondarily,
I’ve been placing Wittgenstein’s writing alongside the film – my hope in doing
this is is that each might illuminate what the other is doing.
A common thread in all this is a kind of preparation for awareness of
potential significance, which is brought about both by representations of our
relationships with others and by reflection on our talking with others about
meaningfulness and significance. We may adopt, wittingly or not, attitudes
that are open or closed to other possibilities of meaning.
Each of these works can plausibly be said to be preparing us to understand
themselves, and then, too, to go on in a similar way – that is, to make us aware
of the attitude we adopt.30 This aim is well put by O.K. Bouwsma, in his
writings aimed at helping the reader come to understand what Wittgenstein is
doing (which we might in fact call (philosophical) criticism). In one instance,
speaking of the Investigations he says: ‘What is Wittgenstein doing in this
book? This is one way of beginning an answer: He is helping us to an
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awareness, a new sensibility, in the matter of our language. There are different
ways of going about this . . . ’31 If we broaden ‘language’ somewhat to mean
something like ‘communication’ more generally – an adjustment I find at
the very least consistent with Wittgenstein’s Investigations-era work – then
I propose that we can say that using film32 could be one of those ways of
helping to bring about awareness.33
fox@calu.edu
NOTES
1See, e.g., Delistrady 2018. Also note
here that I am relying on some version of
what I take to be a common distinction
between ‘significance’ and ‘meaning’. I will
not address this at great length here, but
very briefly: these terms, while sometimes
interchangeable, are not always so. Here,
e.g., I am suggesting that meaning can fig-
ure into the significance of the painting
– but significance could encompass other
aspects of the work (and in this case, it
surely does).
2See, e.g.: https://m.youtube.com/
watch?v=UxHIY7yP2Pw
3User ‘Danny A.’, May 16, 2013, Rotten
Tomatoes (accessed 1.5.2018): ‘It’s very
boring, they filmed everything.’
4Kuehner 2012.
5User ‘Darren B.’, October 9, 2012,
Rotten Tomatoes (accessed 1.5.2018).
6Scott 2009.
7Danto 2014. But for what I see as sim-
ilar, complementary conceptions of what
criticism can be, see also: Cavell 1976a;
Melville 2008; and Elkins 2008. Also see
Cavell 2004.
8Weissberg 2009.
9I am borrowing a phrase here from W.
K. Wimsatt and M. C. Beardsley’s well-
known discussion of the intentional fallacy.
Wimsatt and Beardsley 1946.
10Wittgenstein 1966. Hereafter, I cite
these lectures as (LA x, y), where ‘x’ is
the lecture number and ‘y’ is the (editor’s)
numbered remark.
11This scene is roughly at 00:7:00-
00.08.00.
12The scene is at roughly 00:45:00-
00:55:00.
13See e.g. (LA I, 26).
14This situation is much like our trying
to make sense of any work of art. Some
supplementary information may be help-
ful for this task. And one instance of this
could well be looking at film criticism or
at film history, too, or indeed even at art
history. Of course looking at supplemen-
tary information wouldn’t necessarily help
me.
15See Cavell 1976b.
16Recall Wittgenstein’s characterisation
of the text of the Philosophical Investiga-
tions in his ‘preface’: ‘I should not like
my writing to spare other people the trou-
ble of thinking. But if possible, to stimu-
late someone to thoughts of his own.’ And
then a well-known remark written in 1948:
‘anything your reader can do for himself,
leave to him’. (Wittgenstein et al. 1984,
77).
17These occur at roughly 00:17:00-
00:25:00 and at 00:28:00-00:38:00.
18My experience, watching this scene a
number of times, was one of becoming un-
comfortable, and then becoming aware of
that feeling. (This is why I want to use
the word ‘affective’ here.) Then, I started
thinking about what was going on and
why. I can well imagine my questioning
could have been purely rationally moti-
vated though.
19Arthur Danto says something about
(certain) artworks in the twentieth century
that may be helpful here for understand-
ing some of the critical responses. He says
(in Danto 1964) that it is not surprising
for someone to mistake the artwork for the
(mere) thing it is, since it is in fact that
thing.
197
Police, Adjective and Attunement to the Significance of
Things
20This scene is roughly 01:19:00-
01:22:35.
21‘Nici un.’ (01:19:44).
2201:20:31.
23Cp. Ingmar Bergman’s Scenes from a
Marriage (Sweden, 1974) for a treatment
of a similar point.
24This scene begins at roughly 01:22:40
and lasts about twenty-six minutes.
2501:33:00.
2601:42:21.
27I think it is tempting to assume that
Wittgenstein views the second sense (in-
volving ‘aesthetic judgment’) as ‘better’ in
some way. Given the discussion of deteri-
oration (LA I, 33), I imagine if a student
had raised this point, Wittgenstein’s re-
sponse would have been similar: that he’s
simply ‘describing’ and that one could ap-
prove or disapprove of it. (Note that he
does indicate that the first sense might be
necessary for acquiring the second sense,
but I believe we can produce various coun-
terexamples to this.)
28This then relates to some of the pre-
conceptions about ordinary language phi-
losophy that Avner Baz is concerned to
counter in his Baz 2012. See e.g., his in-
troduction and chapter 2.
29Compare, e.g., (PI 79): ‘say what you
please, so long as it does not prevent you
from seeing how things are.’
30Aside from Wittgenstein’s LA and the
Philosophical Investigations, this idea is of
course found in Cavell’s work. See for in-
stance: Cavell 2004 and 1976a. A more
recent instance can be found in Greve and
Macha 2016, (see in particular their em-
phasis on ‘new categories of criticism’, but
the notion of our ‘going on’ is really per-
vasive throughout the work in this collec-
tion).
31Bouwsma 1982, 1.
32In the context of the literature on film
and philosophy/film as philosophy/etc.,
ultimately I agree with Wartenberg 2016
and Mulhall 2008 in their emphases on
individual treatments of particular films.
This is because that would be the place to
focus one’s attention, if we’re interested in
saying something about the significance of
a film. In my view this is the upshot of,
and, or, motivation for, approaching film
without theory.
33I presented a version of this paper at
the ‘Social Experiences of Film / Film Ex-
periences of Sociality’ conference at New
Europe College (Bucharest) in 2018. I’m
grateful for discussions with the other
participants and with its organisers, Mi-
hai Ometita and Christian Ferencz-Flatz.
I must also acknowledge the seemingly
countless helpful and enjoyable conversa-
tions both with Britt Harrison and with
Cindy Persinger about various ideas con-
tained and not contained in this paper. Fi-
nally, thanks to my University Honors Pro-
gram students in my courses on Wittgen-
stein and aesthetics, from whom I learn
regularly.
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